Summary
Science is a unique institution. In most fields, people are rewarded for hard work with more money and promotions. Scientists on the other hand are primarily paid in terms of credit for discoveries. A scientists strives to be known as the person who discovered this thing or invented that theory. What effect does this desire for credit have on the progress of science as a whole? Is science benefited by this motivation or is it harmed? In this course we will look at a number of mathematical and computer models of scientific behavior which strive to answer this question.
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Social networks have become a central feature of the scientific study of social behavior and have been imported into philosophical discussions – like ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science – where social behavior is important. In ethics, scholars have asked what effect social networks might have on the evolution and maintenance of different ethical norms like fairness, cooperation, and altruism. As epistemologists have begun to take the social nature of knowledge more seriously, they too have begun to ask about how networks might influence the way knowledge is generated and transmitted. Finally, in philosophy of science scholars have asked how incorporating networks might change scientific theory, and how networks of scientists might come to learn about the world. This course will introduce students to the basics of social networks, some of the uses of social networks in philosophy, and how to understand and analyze networks for original research.
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Summary
In the summer of 2015, the University of Vienna held a summer school focused on philosophy of science and computer simulation. I was invited to give two guest lectures. I gave one on the use of computer simulations in epistemology and a second on the use of simulation as a foundational tool in game theory.
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I was invited to give a guest lecture at the Santa Fe Institute's Summer School on Computational Social Sciences. I discussed the relationship between game theory and computer modeling.
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The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy held an event about the use of simulation methods in philosophy. Immediately prior to that event, Conor Mayo-Wilson and I offered a short tutorial about using NetLogo (a simulation platform).
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Communication is ubiquitous throughout the living world and occurs at all levels of biological organization, from within the cell to communication between groups. In the last twenty years or so, formal tools from game theory have helped deepen our understanding of the communication by focusing attention on several questions:
These questions are important for research in a number of different fields. Research utilizing game theory has occurred primarily in philosophy, biology, economics, and, to a lesser extent, psychology. This course will focus on the formal techniques necessary to understand and contribute to the literature on game theory in communication. No prior knowledge of game theory will be presumed. |
Summary
Game theory is a mathematical model of behavior in "strategic situations" -- situations where how well one person does depends on what another does. Situations of this type are ubiquitous, they occur in the animal kingdom, in humans, and even in interaction between computers. Understanding strategic situations is important for understanding the dynamics of natural selection, in theorizing about the relationship between morality and self-interest, in understanding many linguistic behaviors, and in planning robust social and political institutions. In addition to its wide applicability to philosophical problems, there are a number of foundational questions about economics and biology that arise from studying game theory.
This master class will present some of the basics of game theory with an eye to its philosophical uses. We will employ the theory to address (in a basic way) several important philosophical problems. In addition, special attention will be paid to the underlying philosophical assumptions that make game theory applicable. The class will not presume any particular background in game theory or economics, and the mathematical requirements will be kept to a minimum -- knowledge of basic high school algebra should suffice. |
Summary
Simple agent-based models can produce surprisingly strong results. 43 years ago Thomas Schelling demonstrated with his famous checkerboard model that a small racial preference is sufficient to produce strict segregation over time. In recent years agent-based modeling has become common currency in philosophy with work on the emergence and change of moral behavior (Alexander 2007), the social structure of science (Zollman 2007) and the division of cognitive labor (Weisberg & Muldoon 2009). Easily accessible but powerful software (NetLogo) has been developed to democratize agent-based modeling. Yet many philosophers lack even the most basic programming experience and do not know where to begin.
The Ghent doctoral schools (Ghent University) and the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (Tilburg University) offer a five-day course to stimulate the use of this resource. Generally, the course is “hands-on”. The goal is to provide participants with a sound enough basis to start modeling themselves. In order to build, apply, or interpret a computational model, certain basic skills are needed. These can be roughly divided into three categories: conception, coding and valorization. In this five-day course, morning sessions will be led by Aaron Bramson and focus specifically on learning how to code Netlogo models. In the afternoon participants can work in smaller groups on their own projects, with an emphasis on conception and valorization. The afternoon sessions will be led by Kevin Zollman and Ryan Muldoon, philosophers with particular expertise in the application of agent-based models to topics in philosophy. |
Summary
When there is information in a system there are a number of important issues about how that information comes to be transmitted by economic actors. In the case of simple two-agent interactions, information might be strategically released, strategically modified, or withheld altogether. There are a number of (game theoretic) analyses that outline the conditions under which one should expect information to be transmitted. As one moves from a two-agent situation to a multi-agent situation, things become even more complex. Even when everyone desires that information be transmitted, forming optimal institutions for the transmission of that information can be difficult. This day will focus on both the issue of strategic information transmission and the strategic formation of institutions for the transmission of information.
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Summary
Philosophers and social scientists have long been interested in understanding the dynamics of social behavior. How could conventional language emerge when there is no preexisting language? How could cooperative institutions form out of the “state of nature”? How is it that groups of scientists can come to know so much about nature? In the last sixty years, many scholars have turned to utilizing mathematical and computer models to answer these and related questions. This summer school session will look at several applications of these methods to understanding problems in philosophy, economics, sociology, anthropology, and evolutionary biology.
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