


Problem 1

Consider the following extensive form game:



Part A Suppose that $x, y > 0$. What are all the Nash equilibria of this game? Are there any strict equilibrium sets? What is/are the subgame perfect equilibria? Prove what you claim.

Part B Now consider $x > 0, y < 0$. What are all the Nash equilibria of this game? Are there any SESets? What is/are the subgame perfect equilibria?

Part C Now consider $x < 0, y > 0$. What are the Nash of this game? SESets? Subgame perfect equilibria?

Part D Consider $x, y < 0$ What are the Nash of this game? SESets? Subgame perfect equilibria?

Problem 2

For each of the games above in Parts A, B, C, and D illustrate the trajectories for the two-population replicator dynamics. Do trajectories converge to the corners or to the edges? Prove what you claim.

Problem 3

For each of the games from problem 1 illustrate the trajectories for the two-population best response dynamics. Do trajectories converge to the corners or to the edges? Prove what you claim.